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REINVENTING THE LOCAL? PRIVATIZATION, DECENTRAL-
IZATION AND THE POLITICS OF RESOURCE MANAGEMENT: 
EXAMPLES FROM AFRICA
Sara BERRY
Department of History, Johns Hopkins University
ABSTRACT  This paper re-examines the common argument that defi ning and securing local 
ownership of resources and social activities is the key to sustainable development and 
 democratization in contemporary Africa. In the process of deciding who and what are local, 
administrators and policy makers often provoke debates and struggles that lead to confl ict 
rather than cooperation, and complicate rather than clarify practices of resource management 
and governance.
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INTRODUCTION
As evidence mounted in the late 1980s and early 1990s that structural adjust-
ment “reforms” were often followed by deepening poverty and accelerated 
depletion of natural resource, scholars and policy makers began to search for 
alternative approaches. Rather than return to state-centered development strate-
gies that were commonly blamed for the debt crisis and economic stagnation of 
the 1970s, many argued that policy reforms should seek to engage ordinary 
people in the development process by strengthening their access to resources 
and economic opportunities and giving them a greater voice in decisions about 
governance and resource management. Under such rubrics as “community 
titling,” “participatory development,” or “gestion de terroirs,” international agen-
cies and NGOs announced their intention to promote equitable and sustainable 
development, not by curtailing market forces, but by extending the benefi ts of 
market liberalization and good governance to poor and politically marginalized 
people. In keeping with the tenets of market liberalization, it was argued that 
one way to do this was to “empower” local people—individuals and communi-
ties—by securing their rights to land and natural resources, and strengthening 
local structures of governance.
Arguments for local empowerment rest on several assumptions. One, which is 
often implied rather than stated explicitly, is that “local” is synonymous with “poor,” 
“marginalized,” or “ordinary” people, and that channeling resources to local 
communities promotes equitable patterns of growth. A second, related assump-
tion is that ownership of resources is a necessary condition for effective 
resource management. If “local” ownership rights are secured (i.e., clearly 
defi ned and enforced), it is argued, ordinary people will have both the incentive 
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and the authority to decide how to use them. Because they are local, “local” 
people are also likely to be familiar with their immediate surroundings and, in 
many cases, to depend on the local environment for a signifi cant portion of 
their livelihood. In other words, local people have both the incentive and the 
knowledge to manage environmental resources in an effective and sustainable 
manner. Securing their property rights and allowing them increased scope for 
self-government, policy makers argue, will help to create conditions favorable to 
equitable and sustainable development.
Recent studies in Ghana and other African countries suggest that these 
assumptions need to be carefully examined. Programs designed to secure local 
rights of ownership (e.g., through land registration) and/or decentralize structures 
of government often interact with local interests and patterns of authority in 
complex ways, sometimes reinforcing or enhancing differential patterns of privi-
lege, or creating new forms of exclusion, in the name of protecting community 
rights. This happens, I will argue, not only because of manipulation or subver-
sion “from above,” but also because the process of defi ning and authorizing 
local ownership evokes competing claims to identity and entitlement that call 
into question the meaning of “ownership” and “locality” per se. Efforts to 
privatize ownership and decentralize authority and administration give rise to 
struggles over power and resources that complicate, and sometimes subvert, the 
processes of development and democratization that they are intended to support.
In the present essay, I examine some of the issues raised in these struggles, 
and discuss their implications for ordinary people’s involvement in resource 
management and governance. To do this, it is useful to consider how efforts to 
promote local empowerment have been shaped by the prevailing context of 
market liberalization, as well as how far they can be understood in terms of the 
market liberalization paradigm.
I begin by outlining my argument in general terms; then amplify it with 
examples drawn, fi rst, from several recent studies that illustrate some of the 
contingencies of privatization and decentralization in different parts of Africa 
and, second, from my own and others’ researches on forest management  practices 
in Ghana.
MARKET LIBERALIZATION AND THE SEARCH FOR EFFECTIVE GOVER-
NANCE
Current scholarly and practical interest in “local empowerment” developed in 
the context of structural adjustment—programs of economic reorganization 
imposed on African governments by their international creditors in exchange for 
fi nancial assistance to cope with the debt crisis of the late 1970s. The architects 
of structural adjustment argued that economic stagnation and the uncontrolled 
increases in foreign and domestic debts that beset many African countries at the 
time were symptoms of widespread mismanagement and misallocation of 
resources brought on by excessive state involvement in economic activity and 
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market  regulation. Structural adjustment reforms sought to stabilize African 
economies and create a sound basis for future development by opening African 
markets to global investment and competition, and shrinking both the size and 
the scope of African governments’ economic and regulatory activities. Sweeping 
programs of fi scal austerity were implemented rapidly, and the process of 
 dismantling market controls and state owned enterprises began.
In their initial enthusiasm for deregulation, the authors of structural adjust-
ment policies tended to downplay the question of what role governments should 
play in economic affairs—effectively ignoring even standard neoclassical argu-
ments that, in order to function effectively, markets need governments to defi ne 
and enforce contracts and property rights, take account of externalities, regulate 
monopolies, and address the needs of those who are unable to provide for 
themselves. Using the threat of insolvency to push for reform, Africa’s interna-
tional creditors made further fi nancial assistance conditional on governments’ 
adopting sweeping programs of fi scal austerity, deregulation and privatization. 
By the late 1980s, it had become clear not only that economic stabilization 
measures were imposing widespread hardship on the poor, but that deregulation 
was often exacerbating inequality, corruption and environmental degradation, 
rather than promoting sustainable growth.
Spurred by such evidence, proponents of structural adjustment embarked on a 
search for effective forms of governance—not to reverse the course of market 
liberalization in Africa, but to complement and strengthen it. Their efforts took 
a variety of specifi c forms, but in general were designed both to reform the 
structure and performance of African governments themselves, and to expand 
the scope for private or non-governmental agents to engage in both market 
activities and the production and maintenance of social order. Adding “political 
conditionality” to the terms that African governments were required to meet in 
order to qualify for fi nancial assistance, international institutions and donor gov-
ernments pressed states to replace military and one-party regimes with govern-
ments chosen through multi-party elections. They also encouraged increased 
involvement of NGOs in development programming and the provision of social 
services, and experimented with various schemes to strengthen “civil society” 
and promote “participatory” development.
Both the political reforms and the non-governmental capacity building efforts 
sponsored by donor institutions tend to be cast in the mould of privatization. 
During the 1990s, donor institutions sharply reduced their loans and grants to 
African governments, preferring to disburse aid and provide technical and 
 managerial assistance through contracts with private fi rms and consultants.
(1)
 
African governments were also urged to divest themselves of state-owned assets 
and enterprises, sub-contract public services to private fi rms, and implement 
 legislative and administrative measures to clarify and enforce rights of owner-
ship for both private and public agencies.
(2)
 By the turn of the century, these 
efforts had broadened into a widespread campaign to decentralize structures of 
authority and processes of governance, both within and outside of state institu-
tions. In recent years, most state and internationally sponsored schemes of local 
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empowerment have been carried out within the framework of market liberaliza-
tion and governmental “capacity building.” To obtain funds, many grassroots 
and other independent groups have been obliged to follow suit, whether they 
support market liberalization in principle, or not.
MEANINGS AND PRACTICES OF LOCALITY
Like farming systems research, which has been compared to “hitting a 
 moving target” (Maxwell, 1986), “local empowerment” is at best a work in 
progress. “Local” has become something of a catchall term, used to denote 
 people, place, institutions, or cultural practices—or all of these at once, imply-
ing that they coincide or are interchangeable, which is often not the case. Such 
usage is common not only among scholars who seek to describe localities and 
analyze local processes, or policy-makers who want to operationalize them, but 
also in the language and actions of people who are directly involved. As a 
 general precept, “local empowerment” has broad appeal, but when translated 
into specifi c programs to allocate funds, assign rights of ownership, or demar-
cate local jurisdictions, it can become confusing and/or contentious. “Who’s 
local here?” as Pauline Peters put it in her introduction to a symposium on 
 participatory development. “How is a community defi ned and by whom?” (Peters, 
1996). Where does the territory of one locality begin and another end?
Such questions do not admit of quick or easy answers. As Sivaramakrishnan 
explained in a recent article on forest management in West Bengal:
[g]overnmental procedures that nominate one form of community as 
relevant to the government’s vision of development promptly move 
villagers and political representatives to reveal the existence of numer-
ous other forms of community. The denial of other forms of commu-
nity, implicit in the imposition of one form, threatens certain interests 
and identities. These are then asserted in the ensuing  contest to give 
shape to public order institutions (Sivaramakrishnan, 2000: 448).
In Africa, where governments’ visions of development often center, these 
days, on demarcating social, territorial, or jurisdictional boundaries, debates over 
“forms of community” turn on issues of identity and belonging that, in turn, 
raise questions about knowledge and authority. “Who belongs?” leads to “who 
knows?” and “who will, or ought to, decide?”
Raised in response to government or donor initiatives, these questions tend to 
evoke multiple, often confl icting answers. This happens not only because pow-
erful actors manipulate or subvert “local” processes to serve their own interests, 
or because people invent traditions to take advantage of changing circum-
stances,
(3)
 but also because localities have histories. Over time, as people move, 
change their ways, and reorganize social institutions and relationships; they 
accumulate informal “archives” of remembered and/or recorded events and 
83Reinventing the Local?: Examples from Africa
 relationships, which may be called into play when questions of local identity or 
jurisdiction are at issue. In most areas of Africa today, popular accounts of 
“customary” precepts and historical precedents have been augmented by a 
 century or more of state interventions designed to coopt or remake “custom” in 
the service of their own agendas. In establishing and exercising state power, 
both colonial and postcolonial regimes carried out repeated rounds of boundary 
demarcation and social classifi cation, often revising or contravening the work of 
their predecessors in the process. Such histories of state-directed exercises in 
mapping, counting and classifying people and environments and adjudicating 
disputes created their own archives of documented and remembered demarca-
tions, which often inform, revise or compete with unoffi cial stories, rather than 
supplanting them entirely. Together, these state and popular “archives” provide 
an extensive repertoire of overlapping, divergent or confl icting precedents to be 
cited, reinterpreted and contested when new programs of development, land 
 registration, or administrative reorganization are proposed.
Ironically, current efforts to “modernize” African political economies by 
 ratifying and recording rights of ownership, streamlining administrative proce-
dures, and settling unresolved disputes over boundaries and belonging have 
sometimes reopened debates over precedents and “traditions” that were suppos-
edly laid to rest with the end of indirect rule. In the context of market liberal-
ization, programs that seek to privatize ownership, or decentralize authority and 
administration, lend new urgency to old questions of “who’s local?” “who 
knows?” and who should decide? Stimulated by their own distrust of govern-
ment agents, and inspired by examples of indigenous people’s movements in 
other parts of the world, many Africans are re-excavating the past for precepts 
and precedents to defi ne and justify their claims to property and authority in 
the present. As they do so, they fi nd that history’s archives are richly endowed 
with memories as well as artifacts and documents, that possibilities for 
(re)interpretation are legion, and debate, once started, can easily become self-
perpetuating.
The resulting “confusions” are often deplored, both by those who believe that 
decisive action is a necessary condition for social progress, and by those who 
see the ambiguity of unresolved debates as a convenient smokescreen for 
exploitation of the poor by the rich and powerful. Their criticisms are telling, 
but they are not the whole story. Intertwined with debates over the scope and 
legitimacy of authority, struggles over ownership and precedent are implicated 
in practices of governance, as well as in processes of social competition and 
confl ict. As part of the process of privatization and decentralization in Africa, 
they warrant a closer look.
LOCAL EMPOWERMENT IN PRACTICE
In the previous section, I argued in general terms that processes of privatiza-
tion and decentralization tend to generate overlapping and inconclusive debates 
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over boundaries and belonging that may reshape patterns of ownership and 
authority in unexpected ways. The following examples, drawn from recent 
 studies in several different African venues, illustrate some of the ways in which 
this happens.
I. Classifying nature?
Like many development projects, conservation schemes often construct locali-
ties in ways that ignore or play down their dynamism and instability. Like the 
“approche terroir” favored by many francophone planners, which directs plans 
and resources to imagined local communities, and can lead to arbitrary demar-
cations of social and spatial boundaries, schemes for environmental protection 
may give rise to arbitrary classifi cations of species, including humans. In 1990, 
for  example, the World Wide Fund for Nature spearheaded the creation of a 
vast protected area (the Dzanga-Ndoki Park and surrounding “buffer zone” 
known as the Dzanga Sangha Special Reserve) in the equatorial rainforests of 
southwestern Central African Republic (CAR). In drawing up rules for manag-
ing the park, the organizers assumed that the forest was threatened  primarily by 
“outsiders” —migrants and commercial investors who did not understand the 
forest environment, and were prone to misuse it. In  implementing the project, 
WWF distinguished between BaAka, or “pygmies,” who were considered to be 
part of the natural forest habitat, and other Africans who had migrated into the 
area at various times in the past. BaAka were  permitted to hunt and forage 
inside the park (as long as they used “traditional” methods—no wire snares or 
steel-tipped arrows!), but other people were excluded. This logic was extended 
to amenities that the project provided to demonstrate its concern for the welfare 
of local communities. When a school was built on the perimeter of the reserve, 
BaAka children were admitted, but children of Mpiemu and other African 
 parents were not. Although many Mpiemu had lived in the neighborhood for 
two or three generations, they were classifi ed—regardless of age, occupation or 
individual behavior—as “migrants” and therefore an environmental hazard 
(Giles-Vernick, 2000).
II. Basarwa activism.
To avoid such misuse of historical and ethnographic evidence, it is often 
argued that local people should classify themselves. In the current context of 
intellectual and programmatic support for privatization and local empowerment, 
increasing numbers of ordinary people have begun to do this. Mazonde’s 
account of Basarwa politicization, which followed the reorganization of “tribal” 
land tenure in Botswana, is a case in point. Long exoticized by anthropologists 
as relics of pre-neolithic cultures, and exploited as menial laborers by both 
European and Batswana farmers and ranchers, the Basarwa or “Bushmen” were 
left out when land was allocated under Botswana’s Tribal Lands Act in 1968 
because they were not legally recognized as a “tribe.”  Several years later, when 
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privatization and enclosure of range lands was  initiated under the Tribal  Grazing 
Lands Policy,
Basarwa living on such lands were evicted by the ranchers without 
compensation because, not being members of any tribe, they were 
regarded as having no rights to the land they were occupying (Mazonde, 
1996: 55).
In protest, Basarwa activists organized a land rights movement, appealing 
their cases to local Land Boards, lodging complaints with district councils, and 
articulating their cause to the media. With the active encouragement of 
 Namibian groups and some foreign aid agencies, representatives from different 
Basarwa groups soon expanded their political agenda, calling themselves the 
First People of the Kalahari,
(4)
 and demanding representation in national govern-
ment institutions, and the right to education in their mother tongues. Once 
shunned as a term of opprobrium, by the early 1990s, “Basarwa” was becoming 
a symbol of political activism and cultural pride.
Some Basarwa parted company with their self-appointed leaders, however, 
over practical questions of economic strategy. Stressing their claims to indigene-
ity as the original inhabitants of ancient hunting grounds, Basarwa activists 
insisted on their collective right to remain on land that the Botswana govern-
ment wished to convert to a game and wildlife reserve, in order to capitalize 
on the growing international market for ecotourism. But many Basarwa were 
attracted by the government’s offer of cattle in exchange for relocation, and 
chose to leave the reserves instead. According to Mazonde, this division 
between Basarwa spokesmen and their “constituents” allowed the government 
not only to discredit Basarwa activists and undermine their drive for political 
infl uence, but also to delay implementation of the full relocation program. By 
the mid-1990s, the majority of Basarwa remained without cattle, forced to 
depend on meager relief supplies distributed by the state, or work at menial 
jobs for which they earned but a fraction of the average rural household 
income (Mazonde, 1996: 56). Frustrated by the political stalemate, Basarwa 
leaders were beginning to argue that Basarwa should adopt Tswana institutions, 
such as chieftaincy, in apparent contradiction to their original platform of 
 cultural authenticity and their claims to minority rights.
III. Acquired autochthony?
In some situations, offi cial recognition (rather than denial) of local rights to 
land and/or political status may contribute to heightened ethnic consciousness, 
leading to tension or outright confl ict among people who had coexisted without 
diffi culty before the “reforms.” An example may be drawn from recent research 
by Pierre-Yves LeMeur and others in Ouesse, a frontier zone in central Benin 




 centuries, this area served as a refuge for Yoruba and Fon-Adja 
migrants who sought, with varying degrees of success, to escape from Daho-
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mean slave raids. Over time, their descendants came to be known as Mahi, a 
loose ethnic category whose members are now considered “autochtones” in cen-
tral Benin. During the colonial period, the commercialization of food crop culti-
vation drew new migrants into the area from  southwestern and northern Benin, 
while others left Ouesse to work in the cocoa farming regions of Ghana and 
later Cote d’Ivoire. In the 1960s, Idacha (Yoruba) migrants came from the south 
to grow yams, followed by Fon from Abomey and others from northwest Benin 
who were attracted by the development of cotton cultivation in Ouesse in the 
1980s.
Despite the arrival of new migrants, land in Ouesse remained relatively 
 abundant, and land tenure arrangements were loosely defi ned. As in other 
 Yoruba communities in Nigeria and southeastern Benin, land was controlled by 
lineages rather than chiefs, typically those who claimed to be “fi rst comers” in 
the area. Migrants established themselves as clients of one or another 
 landholding lineage, working fi rst as farm laborers, later establishing farms of 
their own, and acknowledging their status as latecomers with occasional contri-
butions of labor, produce or cash. As early immigrants were joined by their 
“brothers,” they introduced them to local landholders and helped them get 
established as farmers, forming a new category of secondary patrons or “tutors” 
who acted as intermediaries between “fi rst comer” lineages and recent immi-
grants.
(5)
After Benin converted to electoral democracy in the early 1990s, the state 
launched a series of initiatives designed to decentralize authority, strengthen 
local management of natural resources (Projet de Gestion des Ressources 
Naturelles du Terroir) and, from 1997, to register individual and community 
holdings of land. In Ouesse, chiefs (axosu), who had previously played no role 
in land matters except to help settle occasional disputes, now put themselves 
forward as experts—repositories of knowledge about local histories of migration 
and land use, that was needed to sort out the boundaries of terroirs and assign 
rights to particular fi elds, pastures, hunting grounds, and forests. Not surpris-
ingly, their newly asserted claims to authority in matters of land allocation and 
local history were challenged, not only by the heads of landholding lineages, 
but also by village headmen, local intellectuals, “tutors” and others who 
expected their voices to be heard.
Contestation over knowledge and authority was also complicated by the 
 multiplicity of institutions and authorities—chiefs, elders, village headmen, sous-
prefets, tribunals de conciliation, courts, village development associations—that 
people could turn to for help in settling disputes. As Christian Lund has argued 
in another context, “the process of recognition of property rights by a politico-
legal institution simultaneously constitutes a process of recognition of the legiti-
macy of this institution (Lund, 2002a). By the same token, when property 
 holders (or claimants) are uncertain about whose authority really counts, they 
may seek to protect themselves by appealing to more than one. In doing so, 
they contribute to the proliferation of parallel, overlapping, and competing insti-
tutions that have become a common feature of local governance in Africa 
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today, and create new opportunities and incentives for debate. (See below, p.97)
IV. The hunters and the state.
Recourse to old methods and institutions is not just a local reaction to  current 
problems. In a recent article, Thomas Bassett described the revival of donzo 
ton, or Mande hunters’ associations, in Cote d’Ivoire, following the end of that 
country’s postcolonial economic expansion and Houphouet’s 30 year rule. As 
Cote d’Ivoire’s declining economy led to rising rates of crime, Mande hunters 
(donzow) were engaged as security guards, fi rst to curtail cattle theft and ban-
ditry in the countryside, and later in urban areas as well.
(6)
 Encouraged by their 
initial successes in catching cattle thieves, the donzo ton expanded their agenda. 
In 1992, for example, they founded their own NGO, Afrique Environnemental, 
dedicated to the preservation of wild animals and their natural habitats. By 
1995, the hunters’ associations had attracted the attention of President Bedie, 
who recruited donzow as election guards, and urged Mande voters to support 
his re-election. When colleagues warned that his rapprochement with the hunters 
could backfi re, however, Bedie abandoned his overtures to the  donzow, and 
shifted to an attack on his predecessor’s liberal policies towards immigration.
(7)
When the Ivorian economy was growing, Bedie argued, it might make sense 
to recruit labor from neighboring countries, but in the straitened circumstances 
of the 1990s, Ivorians’ needs must come fi rst. Playing broadly to popular 
 anxieties over land shortages and declining incomes, Bedie sought to mobilize 
Ivorian sentiment against immigrants. Voting rights were made conditional on 
“Ivorite,” or biological descent from Ivorian parents, and Bedie attempted to 
disqualify his principal rival, Alassane Ouattara, from standing for election on 
the grounds that Ouattara’s parents came from Mali. When land registration was 
introduced in 1997, at the behest of the World Bank, the principle of “autochthony” 
was extended to regions within Cote d’Ivoire, as well as outside its borders. 
Only “autochtones” of a particular region could register as owners of land 
there. The donzo ton were ordered to confi ne their activities to their “original 
sphere” in northern Cote d’Ivoire, and limit them to private security work. They 
re-emerged on the national scene for a brief time under General Guei, but were 
suppressed again by Gbagbo, after some donzow offered protection to Ouattara 
during the coup that overthrew Guei. Harassed by Gbagbo’s police, donzow 
abandoned security work and retreated from the political scene. By 2001, they 
were left with a stark choice between hunting, which was illegal, and unem-
ployment.
Like those of Basarwa activists in Botswana and axosu in Benin, the volatile 
fortunes of the donzo ton underscore the power and the precariousness of local 
identity in the context of market liberalization. Efforts to clarify the social and 
spatial coordinates of “local” communities for purposes of development planning 
and administrative reform have often worked to create new divisions among 
poor or ordinary people, which undermine rather than “empower” their chances 
of meaningful participation in resource management and political decision 
88 S. BERRY
 making. Appeals to history or “tradition” as frameworks for legitimizing ordi-
nary people’s claims to power and resources produce ambiguous results. As 
African economies stagnate, competition over limited resources intensifi es, and 
people struggle to fi nd openings for meaningful political participation. Under 
such stressful conditions, seemingly mundane issues such as demarcating the 
boundary between one “terroir” and another, or deciding who “belongs” to a 
given community, become fraught with tension, inviting questions about relevant 
precedents, and heightening the uncertainty of potential answers. Both endlessly 
malleable and terminally divisive, the politics of “autochthony” underscore the 
importance and the fragility of “local” entitlements as a basis for development 
and democratization.
ASANTE FORESTS: SEARCHING FOR SUSTAINABLE MANAGEMENT
I. Indirect rule, land and the politics of evidence.
If debates over locality and belonging have arisen with new intensity in the 
context of privatization and decentralization, they are hardly unique to the 
 present era. During the colonial period, the daily practices of indirect rule  created 
both opportunities and incentives for Africans to make claims to resources and 
authority in terms of custom and local origin. Unlike donor institutions today, 
which insist on setting policy agendas for African governments but disclaim 
responsibility for implementing them, on the grounds that they must respect their 
national sovereignty, colonial regimes considered themselves conquerors, entitled 
to rule as well as profi t from their appropriated domains. In doing so, they both 
asserted the right to exploit African resources for their own benefi t, and assumed 
responsibility for governing the territories and peoples that produced them.
This proved to be no small task. Most colonial offi cials were quite prepared 
to use force to maintain order and impose their will on subject populations, but 
they also had to pay their way from local sources. To minimize the costs and 
complications of governing large and unfamiliar domains, offi cials resorted to 
indirect rule, working through existing structures of authority and “customary” 
rules, rather than relying solely on force. To make indirect rule work, adminis-
trators needed to know what the customs were, and to fi nd out they had to ask. 
In short, colonial regimes were dependent on their “subjects” not only to 
 furnish the goods, money and manpower which they needed to sustain the work 
of colonial government, but also to tell them how to go about it. “Who’s local 
here?” was as pertinent and as vexed a question in 1900 as it was in the 
1990s.
Asante is a case in point. When British forces occupied Kumase in 1896, 
they abolished the central monarchy, but retained the extensive system of preco-
lonial chiefl y offi ces as a framework for their own colonial administration. 
According to the colonial reading of Asante custom, every Asante was subject 
to someone, and Asante lands belonged to one chiefl y offi ce or another. Admin-
89Reinventing the Local?: Examples from Africa
istering Asante lands and subjects was therefore a matter of determining the 
boundaries of chiefl y jurisdictions, and working out the hierarchy of allegiances 
that determined who might exercise authority over whom. These exercises were 
complicated, however, by the turbulent history of Asante politics, especially 
 during the decades immediately preceding the British conquest. Under the 
 precolonial Asante state, offi ce holders jockeyed for position within a shifting 
hierarchy, shaped by wars of expansion, internal power struggles, and a  complex 
system of transactions, in which they often traded authority over land and/or 
people to collect or defray debts incurred through service, or disservice, to the 
state (McCaskie, 1980; 1995: 56ff). When the British took power in the late 
1890s, they found that chiefs’ jurisdictions were scattered and divided. A stool 
(chiefl y offi ce) might claim authority over a given piece of land but not its 
inhabitants and, at the same time, over subjects who were living on the lands 
of other stools. To simplify and stabilize their own system of administration, 
colonial offi cials spent a great deal of time and energy trying to map chiefl y 
jurisdictions, in both social and spatial terms, and line them up.
The effects of indirect rule and colonial land policy in Asante were both far 
reaching and inconclusive. The principle that land is vested in the stools not 
only became a fi xed tenet in colonial interpretations of customary law, but also 
survived the end of colonial rule.
(8) 
Even Nkrumah, who relieved chiefs of most 
of the administrative and judicial authority they had exercised under colonial 
rule, never abrogated stools’ authority over their lands. His successors not only 
reaffi rmed the principle of stool land ownership but, in 1979, extended it to the 
northern regions of Ghana, where land had previously been held by the state.
(9)
 
This policy has had far-reaching implications for natural resource management 
as well as patterns of land ownership and the constitution of property. By 
endorsing the principle that land is vested in traditional offi ces, both colonial 
and postcolonial governments reaffi rmed the relevance of precolonial precedents 
for establishing claims to land in the present. Thanks in part to the interven-
tions of colonial and postcolonial regimes, property and chieftaincy in Asante 
are grounded in history, and many land claims turn on the complications and 
uncertainties of historical interpretation.
The resilience of chieftaincy and stool land ownership for which Asante is 
famous is not, therefore, a symptom of stubborn traditionalism, but a reminder 
that property is a social process, shaped by the politics of evidence as well as 
the shifting play of market transactions. In 1912, an offi cial report on “conditions 
affecting the alienation of native lands in Asante” quoted a senior Kumase chief 
to the effect that land disputes were not common in Asante because “chiefs 
generally know their boundaries.” Eighty years later, during an interview with 
the head of the Ashanti Regional Lands Commission, I asked where I could 
fi nd a map of stool lands and boundaries throughout the region. The offi cial 
admitted that such a map did not exist, but added that this wasn’t really a 
problem. “Chiefs know their boundaries (Berry, 2001: 17),”
(10)
 he explained, 
implying that when questions did arise, it was not diffi cult to sort them out.
Practically speaking, then, competition over land and chiefl y authority has 
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provided a forum for on-going debates in which interpretations of historical 
precedent play a signifi cant role in contemporary struggles over ownership and 
authority. Throughout the long 20
th
 century, resource management has taken 
place in a context of discussion and disagreements about what chiefs, offi cials, 
and ordinary citizens “know” about the past, and the relevance of historical 
precedents for making claims to power and property in the present. These 
debates set the context for practices of resource management, including the 
management of Asante forests.
II. Sustainable forests?
Since the beginning of the colonial era, forests have played a central role in 
Ghanaian economic development. In addition to supplying plants and animals 
for a great variety of household uses, Ghana’s forests are rich in hardwood 
 species that have proved lucrative as a source of timber for export and raw 
material for the domestic wood processing industry. Commercial timber exploi-
tation began on a small scale in the early 1900s, then grew  rapidly in the 
1950s, in response to rising international prices and the extension of Ghana’s 
road network into previously unexploited forest areas.
(11)
 By the 1960s, timber 
had become the country’s second largest export, as well as providing raw mate-
rials for a growing domestic wood processing industry of small and medium 
sized sawmilling and furniture making enterprises. 
By the time the timber industry took off in the 1950s, Ghana’s sub-humid 
rain forest zone was already extensively planted in cocoa. Introduced to West 
Africa from the Amazon and the Caribbean in the late 19
th
 century, cocoa 
 cultivation spread rapidly during the early years of colonial rule, especially in 
southern Ghana, where environmental conditions were well suited to the new 
crop. By 1910, Ghana had become the world’s leading producer of cocoa, and 
cocoa continued to provide the major part of the country’s foreign exchange 
earnings until the late 1970s. Since the crop does best when planted on  partially 
cleared forest land, cocoa had begun to encroach on Ghana’s forests long before 
commercial logging entered the scene. Together, cocoa and timber fuelled the 
Ghanaian economy for nearly a century, at substantial cost to its forest cover.
(12)
For the state, the long-term decline in Ghana’s forests poses a dilemma. Both 
colonial and postcolonial regimes clearly perceived the importance of the forests 
for the long-term viability of the Ghanaian economy, and both derived a 
 substantial portion of their revenue from taxing forest exploitation directly, 
through timber royalties and license fees, and indirectly, through export and 
import duties, and marketing board surpluses. For most of the 20
th
 century, 
therefore, the state’s economic interests were squarely divided between sustain-
ing Ghana’s forests in the long term, and exploiting them now. Individuals and 
fi rms faced a similar trade-off, of course, although they may have weighed 
present and future differently, depending on changing circumstances. Combined 
with on-going debates over resource ownership and authority (fostered, as we 
have seen, by indirect rule and by postcolonial struggles over land and power), 
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the contradictions of both state and private interests in the future of the forests 
have helped to create a volatile context for practices of forest management.
Strategies for sustaining Ghana’s forests have usually involved some combi-
nation of protection, through restrictions on forest access and use, and planting 
trees. Colonial authorities established the fi rst forest reserves in 1911, after a 
lengthy legal debate that helped inscribe the principle of stool land ownership 
in colonial interpretations of customary land law (See, inter alia, Amanor, 1999; 
Berry, 2001; Woodman, 1996), and began to experiment with tree planting 
schemes in the 1920s. Both tree planting and forest protection schemes have 
taken different forms at different times. The following examples are not meant 
to represent Ghanaian forest management practices in any systematic way, but 
simply to illustrate some of the dynamics involved.
III. Planting trees
Encouraged, perhaps, by the success story of cocoa, both colonial and post-
colonial governments have made several attempts to persuade Ghanaian farmers 
to plant timber as well as fruit-bearing species of trees. In the 1920s, the 
 Forestry Department experimented with opening portions of degraded forest 
reserve lands to farmers, on condition that they interplant young timber trees 
among their food crops. Known by its Malaysian name of taungya, this system 
was practiced only on a limited scale until the 1970s, when nationwide short-
ages of foodstuffs prompted offi cials to revive and expand it. Farmers responded 
readily to the offer of extra land, but contributed little to the nation’s stock of 
forest trees. Knowing that they had nothing to gain in the long run from 
expending energy on trees that, by law, belonged to the state,
(13) 
farmers 
neglected tree seedlings in favor of their own crops. Some also extended their 
farms on forest reserve land beyond the plots allocated to them by forestry 
 offi cials, and/or substituted fruit-bearing trees for the timber species they were 
supposed to plant for the government. Farmers showed even less interest in 
planting timber species outside the reserves, preferring to concentrate on crops 
that promised quicker returns.
In 1980s and 1990s, however, conditions changed. Timber exports revived 
under structural adjustment, mostly in the form of unprocessed logs. To 
 stimulate domestic wood processing and increase Ghana’s share of value added 
by the timber industry as a whole, the government imposed a ban on exports 
of unprocessed logs. At about the same time, the Rawlings regime also began a 
sustained program of rural electrifi cation, creating a substantial demand for 
 utility poles. As the domestic market for wood products expanded, some 
 Ghanaians began to experiment with planting timber trees on private land. The 
most popular species was teak. Potentially harvestable after 10 years for utility 
poles or 25 years as raw material for the domestic wood processing industry, 
teak has the added advantage of being relatively resistant to fi re. By the 
 mid-1990s, stands of teak—both small plots adjacent to people’s houses, and 
larger ones in the bush—were becoming an increasingly common sight along 
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main highways and rural roads.
To learn more about this relatively new form of tree crop cultivation, in 
2001, I carried out a small survey among members of the Ashanti Regional 
Tree Growers Association (ARTGA), a voluntary organization established, with 
the encouragement of staff members of the local Forestry Department, in 
1996.
(14)
 My informants said they had experienced little diffi culty in obtaining 
land for planting their trees. Most had either purchased land to establish their 
farms, or obtained permission from their relatives to plant trees on a portion of 
family land; two of them had done both. None of them seemed concerned 
about questions of ownership, or the security of their claims to future harvests. 
Those who had planted with their relatives’ concurrence explained that “the 
land is for the family, but the trees are for me.” Similarly, growers who had 
“purchased” land from a chief pointed out that, in principle, the land was theirs 
to use for 99 years, far longer than it takes to raise and harvest a stand of 
trees. Since most had planted their trees in the 1990s and were not yet ready 
to harvest them, such questions lay in the future, and farmers were not overly 
concerned with them.
If land was not cited as an immediate problem, growers were concerned over 
how to provide adequate inputs of labor to maintain the value of the trees. Site 
preparation and planting are done mostly by hand, and the work involved in 
clearing and planting even a small stand of trees can be substantial. Informants’ 
estimates ran from 12 to 16 person days per acre, depending on the initial 
 condition of the plot. Establishing a new farm is only the beginning, however. 
Weeds and shrubs grow rapidly in the West African sub-humid zone. They can 
stifl e young seedlings in a matter of weeks, and slow or stunt the growth of 
saplings even after the latter have grown fairly tall. Tree farms must be 
weeded, therefore, on a regular basis—preferably two or three times a year. In 
addition, young trees should be pruned periodically, so that the trunks will grow 
straight, to enhance their future market value. In short, cultivating teak as a 
cash crop requires regular inputs of labor over a number of years, as well as 
secure long-term rights to the trees themselves and access to land they are 
planted on.
With one exception, the growers whom I interviewed were not full-time 
farmers. Most were urban residents: they derived most of their income from 
commercial, artisanal or professional (self-) employment, and had planted teak 
as an investment rather than an occupation. Since they rarely worked on the 
farms themselves and, in many cases, lived too far away even to supervise 
them on a daily basis, growers relied on other people to do the actual work of 
establishing and maintaining the trees. Finding laborers was not diffi cult, they 
explained; the problem was how to pay them.
Like many cocoa farmers in the past, teak growers used family labor when 
they could get it. Several of my informants received assistance from family 
members who happened to live near the farm, and helped by supervising 
 laborers, as well as working on the farm themselves. Kinsmen were not paid 
directly, apart from occasional small gifts of cash to “thank” them for their 
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efforts, and their status with respect to the farm itself was not clearly spelled 
out. As one forestry offi cial put it, in Ghana, everyone agrees that cultivated 
trees belong to the planter—but who is “the planter”? In the past, many cocoa 
farmers relied extensively on the unpaid labor of their wives and children, who 
later claimed that they were entitled to a share of the farm in return.
(15)
 
Whether such claims will arise with respect to teak farms remains to be seen: 
growers’ formulaic insistence that “the land is for the family, the trees are for 
me” may have been intended to suggest that the question need not arise. 
Whether their relatives would agree, however, was unclear. I did not have a 
chance to interview any of them independently.
A few growers had also given portions of their land to sharecroppers, to 
clear and plant teak seedlings for the grower together with food crops for them-
selves. Once the trees grew tall enough to form a canopy, food crops could no 
longer be grown on the same land, but for the fi rst two or three years, a 
grower could avoid having to pay wages by using sharecroppers. Like the 
taungya system used by the Forestry Department to regenerate degraded areas 
of the reserves, however, such sharecropping arrangements were not very 
 popular. Growers complained that sharecroppers neglected or damaged the 
 seedlings while tending to their food crops, and that the teak did poorly as a 
result. To minimize such problems, and avoid future disputes over the proceeds 
of their farms, growers relied primarily on hired labor.
IV. Our problem is money.
Unlike cocoa and other fruit-bearing trees, which begin to yield a few years 
after they are planted and may continue to do so for many years after that, 
teak brings in no revenue at all until the trees are harvested, ten to twenty-fi ve 
years or more after planting. Throughout that time, the grower must either fi nd 
the means to compensate farm labor at regular intervals, or watch the quality 
of the farm deteriorate for lack of proper  weeding and pruning. Since laborers 
work on a daily or piece rate basis and expect to be paid as soon as their 
work is done, growers face a continual “pressure of cash”
 (16)
 to establish and 
manage their farms in such a way that they could reasonably expect to have 
marketable trees in the future. Most of my informants had invested personal 
savings in acquiring land and planting their fi rst trees, and continued to meet at 
least part of the annual cost of farm maintenance out of off-farm earnings. 
 Several had also planted oil palm or fruit trees on part of their land, and sold 
fruit to help pay for weeding and pruning.
 (17)
 Despite these efforts, however, 
funds were in short supply:  growers were often unable to weed and prune as 
often as they wanted to, and many said they would like to plant more trees, 
but could not afford to maintain them.
The alternative, of course, would be to borrow, but the cost of credit in 
Ghana is extremely high. At annual interest rates of 50% or more, commercial 
loans are prohibitively expensive. Despite their avowed aim of promoting rural 
and agricultural investment, the Rural Banks do not make subsidized loans to 
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farmers, or accept tree crops as collateral. One grower who had borrowed from 
a Rural Bank was obliged to repay the loan after three years, long before he 
could expect any return from his farm, and most of his colleagues were not 
willing to take on such an obligation. To encourage private growers, the 
 Forestry Commission created a special Forest Plantation Development Center, 
and attempted to raise money from international sources, with little success. 
Touting the virtues of market viability and self-reliance, the World Bank makes 
few large loans or grants for program support, relying instead on small amounts 
of seed money, elaborately and expensively monitored, to stimulate local initia-
tive. Other international lenders have followed suit—IDA, for example, does not 
permit on-lending at less than commercial rates, even for poverty alleviation—
and private investors have shown little interest in small-scale farming ventures. 
After holding out hope for several years that assistance for individual growers 
might soon be forthcoming, offi cials appeared to have put the idea on hold. In 
2002, plans to establish large-scale commercial plantations on degraded forest 
reserve lands were under active discussion. Hoping to salvage something from 
their experience with teak, several of the growers whose farms I had visited in 
2001 had shifted their attention from maintaining their half-grown trees, to 
planting seedlings for immediate sale to the Forestry Commission.
V. Protecting forests
Private tree planting is not, of course, the only approach that has been tried 
to sustain Ghana’s forests. The idea of creating forest reserves was mooted as 
early as the 1890s, and put into practice a few years later. Others have written 
extensively on the history of forest protection policies in Ghana, and I will not 
repeat their fi ndings here (Amanor, 1999). Instead, I want to discuss some of 
the implications of forest regulation for changing structures and practices of 
governance.
Timber cutting was practiced on a small scale during the early years of the 
colonial era, but did not grow signifi cantly until world markets for primary 
commodities began to revive after the end of the Second World War. From the 
late 1940s, however, timber cutting grew rapidly. To secure a substantial share 
of timber earnings for the state, the Nkrumah regime passed the Concessions 
Act of 1962, vesting all commercially valuable timber trees in the state, 
whether they stood on public or on privately held land. As the legal owner of 
timber trees, the state granted concessions to logging companies, and collected 
royalties from them for the trees they cut down and sold. To implement the 
terms of the Concessions Act, government developed an elaborate system for 
classifying timber species, assessing royalties, and monitoring the movement and 
sale of logs.
During the economic decline of the late 1970s and early 1980s, many 
 Ghanaian timber contractors were forced out of business and exports declined, 
but investment picked up after Ghana opted for structural adjustment,
(18) 
and a 
number of timber concessions were awarded to non-Ghanaian enterprises. 
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Exports, mainly of unprocessed logs, increased, and the profi ts were transferred 
abroad, leaving little to invest in replenishing the stock of trees in Ghana. 
Efforts to stem the accelerating rate of forest depletion by policing the reserves 
led to resistance from local farmers that sometimes resulted in violence. In 
addition, many concessions were awarded for trees on private land,
(19)
 creating 
friction between concessionaires and local farmers, who were not legally  entitled 
to any benefi t from the sale of the trees, and rarely received compensation from 
contractors for crops that were damaged in the course of timber removal. To 
escape what one farmer called “the operation of loggers and wanton destruction 
of crops,” he and others sometimes went so far as to destroy naturally regener-
ating trees. “Putting fi re to [the stumps] solves it all.” (Quoted in Amanor, 
1999: 68).
Following the turmoil of the early 1990s, the Forestry Department (now 
 Forestry Commission) changed its tactics. Regulations were changed, requiring 
contractors to obtain farmers’ written consent before they cut timber on private 
land, and offi cials began to organize “biodiversity committees” to include local 
residents in the design and implementation of conservation policies. With royal-
ties and other revenues at stake, government continues to regulate trade in logs 
and wood products, however, and remains actively engaged in efforts to prevent 
illegal logging and promote forest regeneration. In recent years, economic 
 stagnation and declining real incomes have reinforced incentives for illegal 
 timber cutting and trade. Complaints about illegal chainsaw operators have 
become routine, in Parliament and the press, and forestry offi cials wage a 
perennial struggle to limit encroachment into the Forest Reserves. Pointing out 
that offi cials themselves are hardly indifferent to market incentives, many citi-
zens shrug off government restrictions on access to the reserves as ineffective, 
if not downright self-serving.
Indeed, rather than an impersonal barrier to excessive and/or destructive 
 forest exploitation, regulation has become a kind of pseudo-market, paralleling 
but also interacting with legal markets for both land and trees. This is not, as 
proponents of market liberalization would argue, simply another example of the 
power of market forces vis a vis the limited capacities of a weak state, but 
points instead to the basic interdependence between governance and resource 
allocation. Earlier, I suggested that experiences with market liberalization in the 
1980s served to remind the authors of structural adjustment that markets do not 
function well without some form of government, but it also worked the other 
way. Market competition may induce some fi rms to become more effi cient, but 
it also creates strong incentives for people to protect themselves against uncer-
tainty and loss by acquiring power and using it to limit competition and control 
the terms on which they do business. The use of power to shape market 
 conditions is not a social aberration peculiar to bureaucrats and politicians, but 
a basic concomitant of economic activity, just as mobilizing and allocating 
resources is part of the business of governing.
Like many other sectors of Africa’s structurally adjusted economies, forest 
protection measures in Ghana illustrate the mutual infl uence, and interdepen-
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dence, between governance and economy. Regulatory activities, like successful 
business enterprises, attract imitators. If a state agency, such as the Forestry 
Commission, succeeds in generating and collecting rent by regulating the condi-
tions of timber exploitation, either legally in the form of royalties or illegally 
as bribes, others are likely to try their hand at it. Competition among state 
agencies, or individual offi cials, is commonplace, as actors vie for revenue and 
prestige in both formal and informal venues. In 2001, for example, following a 
recent decision to raise the Forestry Commission’s statutory share of timber 
 royalties from 10% to 60%, the Offi ce of Stool Lands Administration was 
 lobbying vigorously for a similar increase in the proportion of stool land 
 revenues that it was allowed to retain “for administrative expenses.”
(20)
But imitators do not arise only from within state institutions: they may 
 operate entirely outside formal channels of government authority, or act in both 
offi cial and unoffi cial capacities at once. State efforts to protect Ghana’s forests 
by limiting access to forest reserves and/or regulating transactions in forest 
products have led, in part, to a proliferation of regulators, as illustrated by the 
following anecdote.
In 1994, I lived for a couple of months in a rural Asante town, collecting 
information for a study of land claims in Asante Region. Walking through town 
one day, I came upon a large, untidy heap of roughly cut slabs of timber piled 
haphazardly by the road in front of the chief’s palace. When I asked a group 
of bystanders where the wood came from, I was told that someone had been 
trying to move it without the proper permit, and it had been impounded.
The explanation seemed plausible, but incomplete. The Forestry Department 
had an offi ce on the other side of town—so what were the logs doing in front 
of the chief’s palace? “Who impounded them?” I asked, after a moment’s 
refl ection. “Oh,” said a bystander, offhandedly. “It was the chief’s forest 
guards.”
Under current statute, traditional rulers may engage in timber cutting, or any 
other form of legitimate business activity, in their personal capacity, but they 
have no authority either to make rules regulating the use or sale of forest 
resources, or to enforce rules made by the government. In this case, the chief 
may have been acting as a kind of amicus curiae, hoping to gain recognition 
as a good citizen, committed to upholding the law and ready to assist state 
offi cials in the work of enforcing it. Whatever his intent, in effect he was 
 positioning himself, and his offi ce, as a kind of parallel, or shadow, bureau-
cracy—simultaneously engaged in the state-approved work of market regulation, 
and acting as an independent authority. In postcolonial Ghana, where traditional 
rulers walk a delicate tightrope between their formal status as cultural artifacts, 
and their active pursuit of wealth and infl uence through informal channels, the 
invention of “the chief’s forest guards” suggests a balancing ability of some 
fi nesse.
By itself, a heap of wood chunks by a rural roadside is of little importance, 
but this incident illustrates a pattern that is widespread and, I think,  underplayed 
in recent analyses of state capacity and governing practices in contemporary 
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Africa. Partly under the aegis of indirect rule, but also through the ups and 
downs of political competition and changes of regime in the postcolonial period, 
authorities have proliferated, at national and regional as well as local levels of 
social interaction. As each new regime seeks to establish and consolidate its 
power by reorganizing or replacing old institutions and agents with new ones, 
those threatened with loss of power look for ways to protect themselves, 
 continuing to claim or aspire to roles in the ordering of social interactions and 
relationships, whether or not they are formally recognized as state employees or 
legitimate social actors, and others emerge to join the fray. Examples are legion: 
to the accumulation of state institutions left over from the colonial era and/or 
created by successive postcolonial regimes, recent years have added soaring 
numbers of NGOs, fed by a growing demand for sub-contractors and consul-
tants in the age of market liberalization, together with new or refurbished 
 professional organizations, citizens’ lobbies, grassroots associations, political par-
ties, and “traditional” offi ces and institutions. In 1992, in one small rural  district 
in eastern Zimbabwe, Sam Moyo found eleven state agencies, fi fteen NGOs and 
eight local councils, plus an unspecifi ed number of chiefs, village headmen, 
spirit mediums, traditional healers, gardening groups and others, all claiming to 
play a role as “land management institutions.”
 
(Moyo, 1995: 190ff)
Some “authorities” are self-consciously new, others claim ancient prove-
nance—but dividing them into “modern” and “traditional” is beside the point 
(Herbst, 2000).
 (21)
 As Christian Lund has argued, in another context, authority 
derives in part from usage: when people appeal to an offi ce or institution to 
validate a claim, settle a dispute, or chart a course of action, the process of 
making the appeal tends to affi rm the authority of the one(s) appealed to. (Lund, 
2002a) In other words, the process of authorization works to authorize the 
authorizer, as well as the thing authorized.
As Lund’s own studies attest, this dynamic may operate in many social and 
institutional venues at one time, contributing to the consolidation of power and 
authority in some cases, and the proliferation of authorizing agents and institu-
tions in others. In the present context of internationally mandated pressures for 
market liberalization, combined with Africans’ continuing struggles to sort out 
basic questions of governance and political participation following the upheavals 
of colonial conquest and rule, institutions often proliferate, creating complex 
mosaics of authorization and confl ict that defy ready classifi cation. As the 
example of “the chief’s forest guards” suggests, this argument helps to explain 
what is sometimes referred to, misleadingly, as the resilience of traditional rule 
in modern African nations. Trading on the symbolic appeal of ancient precedent 
and cultural “authenticity,” holders of traditional offi ce may seek to strengthen 
their positions, vis a vis the state and one another, by exercising de facto 
authority that they do not hold de jure. In the process, they join numerous 
other aspiring competitors in the political marketplace of contemporary gover-
nance, and some gain reputations for achievement that lend legitimacy to their 
claims.
In Asante, these claims have recently gained the attention of the World Bank. 
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Engaged in its own, on-going search for self-supporting “partners” in the  project 
of market liberalization, in 2002, the Bank launched a pilot project, “Promoting 
Partnerships with Traditional Authorities,” to build governing capacity among 
Asante’s traditional rulers. According to preliminary reports, the project intended, 
inter alia, to promote transparency and accountability by distributing personal 
computers to senior chiefs and teaching them to use spreadsheets to keep track 
of their revenues and expenditures. Unaware, perhaps, of Asante chiefs’ long 
history of successfully eluding both popular and offi cial demands for fi nancial 
oversight, the Bank’s proposal does not discuss the possibility that information 
technology might be used for the same purpose—or comment on any possible 
resemblance between “promoting partnerships with traditional authorities” and 
indirect rule.
CONCLUSION
The proliferation of regulatory agencies in forest management and many other 
fi elds of governing practice run counter to the common tendency to assume that 
localities are stable, bounded arenas of social, economic and political  interaction, 
with clearly defi ned “interests” and capacities for self regulation. If as I have 
argued here, such assumptions underlie many contemporary schemes to promote 
equitable and sustainable development by formalizing local ownership and dele-
gating authority and responsibility to “communities” and local governments, it 
is important to look closely at the processes involved. To understand the impli-
cations of privatization and decentralization for resource management, we might 
begin by recognizing that localities have histories; that “local empowerment” 
can be exclusionary or divisive rather than enabling; and that processes of 
 governing are built, inter alia, on struggles over resources and debates over 
knowledge and historical precedent that need to be analytically accounted for, 
rather than praised or condemned en bloc, as agents of, or obstacles to, 
 sustained and equitable development.
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NOTES
(1) Aid to African governments declined in the 1990s in part because funds were diverted 
to promote privatization in eastern Europe and Russia following the collapse of the 
 former Soviet bloc.
(2) Note that privatization is not the same as individualization. Firms, NGOs, communities, 
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and social groups that choose to incorporate are treated in many countries as jural 
 individuals, both in law and in economic and policy analysis.
(3) Classic formulations of this argument include Ranger (1983) and Chanock (1985).
(4) The similarity to indigenous groups in Canada who call themselves First Nations, 
 underscores the international appeal of such confi gurations.
(5) Similar land and labor arrangements were common in the cocoa farming areas of south-
western Nigeria and, more recently, in Cote d’Ivoire. Chauveau uses the term tutorat to 
denote relations of clientage between local farmers and immigrants (Chauveau, 2000). 
Similar arrangements were common in the Nigerian cocoa belt before the oil boom of 
the 1970s.
(6) Their effectiveness was popularly attributed to their possession of special medicines 
which protected them from bullets and other conventional weapons. Bassett quotes an 
Ivorian policeman who said that when he and his colleagues arrested donzow, they did 
not try to tie them up, but instead undressed them in order to remove their amulets 
(Bassett, 2003: 23).
(7) Bedie’s associates pointed to the kamajor, hunters’ associations in Sierra Leone who 
were originally mobilized to help defend rural communities from terrorist guerrillas dur-
ing Sierra Leone’s civil war, but eventually became a guerrilla force in their own right, 
preying on the rural populations they were supposed to protect. See, e. g., Reno (1998).
(8) In Ghanaian legal parlance, traditional offi ces are said to hold allodial, or ultimate, title 
to land. Land may be allocated to individuals or fi rms under long term (50 or 99 year) 
leaseholds, but ultimate title remains with the stool. Whether stools can exercise any 
 effective claim to land that has been “sold” to long-term leaseholders—and on whose 
behalf they do so—has been the subject of much debate among both scholars and legal 
practitioners. See, e.g., Woodman (1996).
(9) When the Northern Territories were annexed to the Gold Coast Colony and Protector-
ate, in 1905, land was declared to be the property of the Crown. After independence, it 
became the property of the state until 1979, when the Constitution of the Third 
 Republic extended the principle that “land is vested in the appropriate stool or skin” to 
the  northern regions.
(10) The chief who spoke these words in 1912 was one of the few among his peers who 
could converse with colonial offi cials in their own language. An astute businessman 
and politician, he occupied his stool for nearly five decades, during which time he 
worked tirelessly to turn customary prerogatives to legal and fi nancial advantage, and 
vice versa. See also McCaskie (1976; 2000).
(11) Amanor provides an excellent review of the history of forest exploitation in Ghana 
 during the 20
th
 century in Amanor (1999).
(12) Estimated to cover one-third of Ghana’s territory at the turn of the century, forests had 
dwindled to less than 10% by the 1980s. Agyeman (1994).
(13) Since 1962, all marketable species of timber trees in Ghana have belonged to the state. 
See below, p.91.
(14) In 2001, ARTGA had over 700 members, an office in the center of Kumasi, and a 
 nursery outside the city on the main road to Accra that supplied stumps and seedlings to 
both individual and institutional growers. In addition to helpful discussions with 
 ARTGA offi cers, I interviewed 16 individual growers, and visited 10 farms located in 
different parts of Ashanti Region. I am grateful to the Secretary of ARTGA, Mr. A. 
Agyemang and members of the Executive Board, and to the individual growers who 
shared their experiences with me and, in several cases, spent considerable time taking 
me to visit their farms.
(15) The literature on this topic is too extensive to cite, but see, e. g., Okali (1983), Mikell 
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(1986), Allman & Tashjian (2000).
(16) I have borrowed this phrase, with admiration, from Arhin (1977).
(17) Some farmers gave plots to tenants, to plant food crops among the young trees—a kind 
of private taungya arrangement, with many of the same problems. Others interplanted 
teak with fruit trees—citrus, avocado, cashew.
(18) As basic international trade theory would predict, foreign investment was concentrated 
in natural resource extractive industries, where Ghana’s short-term comparative 
 advantage was obvious, and investors could expect quick returns. Between 1983 and 
1994, minerals (mostly gold) and timber combined rose from 25% to 60% of the total 
value of merchandise exports (Aryeetey et al., eds. 2000: 179).
(19) Under the Concessions Act of 1962, all timber trees in Ghana are vested in the state, to 
manage “in trust for the stools.” By implying that stools hold allodial rights to trees, as 
well as land, this law “effectively denied farmers rights to economic benefits from 
 timber trees on their land,” and sharpened contention between chiefs and state over the 
division of timber revenues (Amanor, 1999: 65).
(20) The Offi ce of the Stool Land Administrator is responsible for collecting “customary” 
rents and royalties, and remitting them to the Traditional Council to which they are due. 
As of 2002, the Offi ce was allowed to deduct 10% of the amounts collected to cover its 
administrative expenses.
(21) In describing traditional chiefs as reactionary political actors bent on exploiting the 
weakness of contemporary African states to withstand the forces of modernization, 
Herbst seems to me to be completely misreading the history of political and economic 
transformations in Africa under colonial and postcolonial rule.
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